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Abstract 
This paper reports new evidence on the causal link between education and male youth crime using 
individual level state-wide administrative data for Queensland, Australia. Enactment of the Earning or 
Learning education reform of 2006, with a mandatory increase in minimum school leaving age, is 
used to identify a causal impact of schooling on male youth crime. The richness of the matched 
(across agency) individual level panel data enables the analysis to shed significant light on the extent 
to which the causal impact reflects incapacitation, or whether more schooling acts to reduce crime 
after youths have left compulsory schooling. The empirical analysis uncovers a significant 
incapacitation effect, as remaining in school for longer reduces crime whilst in school, but also a 
sizeable crime reducing impact of education for young men in their late teens and early twenties. We 
also carry out analysis by major crime type and differentiate between single and multiple offending 
behaviour. Crime reduction effects are concentrated in property crime and single crime incidence, 
rather than altering the behaviour of the recalcitrant persistent offender. 
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Larrikin:  “A boisterous, often badly behaved young man” 
[Noun, Australian, Oxford Dictionary] 
1. Introduction
A small, but growing, body of economic research examines the causal link between 
education and crime. In this research, causality has been established using instrumental 
variable methods, with three key alternative approaches thus far adopted. Two of the 
approaches – from Jacob and Lefgren (2003) and Luallen (2006) use teacher training days 
and teacher strikes respectively to identify an exogenous shock in the number of days pupils 
spend in school. Given the small size and infrequency of such shocks, these evidently 
identify very local effects on crime. The alternative approach is both more general and more 
frequently adopted, and exploits changes or differences in compulsory school leaving age 
either spatially or temporally (or both) to generate exogenous increases in schooling level. 
For example, Lochner and Moretti (2004), Anderson (2014) and Bell, Costa and Machin 
(2016a, 2016b) exploit state level school dropout age reforms in the US, whereas Machin, 
Marie and Vujic (2011) and Hjalmarsson, Holmlund and Lindquist (2015) respectively 
analyse changes in the compulsory school leaving age in England and Wales and Sweden 
respectively. 
The empirical literature based on exogenous variation generated from schooling 
reforms consistently reports a significant, often sizeable, causal relationship between 
increases in education and crime reduction. There are two credible explanations. First, 
additional schooling increases human capital which in turn increases the return from 
traditional labour market pursuits relative to a life of crime. Alternatively, staying in school 
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for longer may generate crime reduction via incapacitation which minimises opportunities 
for criminal activity.  
The implications of the two alternate explanations differ. In the former more positive 
view, additional schooling equips students with higher valued labour market skills and 
anticipates a lifelong impact of reduced criminal activity. In the strongest form of the latter 
explanation, the incapacitation effect limits the opportunity for criminal activity only during 
the time period of extended schooling. However, if a more dynamic response is permitted, 
then incapacitation effects may spill over into future time periods post school, and thus also 
generate longer run crime reductions.1 This possibility arises if the hazard function of 
initiating a life of crime spikes over the very early ages of 15 to 18, which in many countries 
correspond to the final years of compulsory schooling. In this case, incapacitation during 
this critical period may also have a long run impact. Finally, if age of crime onset shifts due 
to incapacitation then the shape of the crime-age profile may also alter (Costa, Bell and 
Machin, 2016b). 
Given data limitations it has proven rather difficult to cast light on the relative 
importance of the above two major underlying explanations of the causal impact of 
schooling on crime. Jacob and Lefgren (2003), Luallen (2006) and Anderson (2014) all 
examine the contemporaneous relationship between crime and education. They find 
evidence to support the role of an incapacitation effect that reduces crime. The former two 
studies suggest that although property crime decreases due to an exogenous increase in 
school attendance, violent crime increases. Anderson (2014) on the other hand concludes 
that additional schooling decreases both property and violent crime. 
1 For theoretical approaches looking at crime dynamics and education see, for example, Mocan, Billups and 
Overland (2005) or Fella and Gallipoli (2014). 
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In this paper, we revisit the causal impact of education on crime, as well as studying 
the importance of incapacitation effects. To do so, we utilise a rich administrative data set 
incorporating matched individual level panel data on both schooling and criminal offences 
prior to and post compulsory school for the entire Queensland state school student 
population from 2002 to 2013. The longitudinal dimension at the level of the individual 
proves to be extremely valuable for pinning down evidence of short run incapacitation 
versus longer run deterrence effects of education on crime. 
To ensure causality runs from schooling to crime, we exploit the exogenous 
variation induced by the introduction of the Earning and Learning reform which raised the 
school leaving age in Queensland in the 2006 school year.2 Prior to the reform the minimum 
school leaving age was either 15 or completion of grade 10 (i.e. whichever occurred first). 
The reform  defined a two year compulsory participation phase where individuals must 
engage in either learning or earning broadly defined, incorporating the options of staying 
on at school, enrolling in vocational education, an apprenticeship, or working full-time. The 
compulsory participation phase in turn lasts two years post-compulsory school age or until 
the individual turns age 17 (ACARA, 2009).  
The rich micro data set also enables us to examine the issue of incapacitation at the 
level of individual offenders. We do this in two ways. First, we look at the interaction 
between exposure to the treatment - the Earning and Learning reform - and age and alleged 
criminal activity. Thus we examine the persistence of crime reduction after leaving school. 
Second, we study whether the policy reform altered the shape of the crime-age profile 
2 In Queensland, the school year runs from January to December. However, the enrolment window is different. 
A child can enter the current year grade 1 class if they are 6 years of age in January of the year of enrolment 
or turning 6 by 30 June of the year of enrolment (DET, 2016). This effectively means the enrolment window 
for grade 1 is from 1 July of the previous year to 30 June of the year of enrolment. As we have exact date of 
birth in the data – unlike in much of the work so far – we can match students exactly to school years. Access 
to micro data with exact date of birth means we can identify the birth cohorts affected by the reform accurately. 
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characterising young people in Queensland and whether patterns of offending behaviour 
altered. 
To preview our findings, we uncover a sizeable causal impact of education on youth 
crime. This is the case for all crime, as well as by major crime type (that is, violent, property 
and drug offences). Moreover, part of the crime reduction works through an incapacitation 
effect as the impact of the schooling reform on crime is larger for individuals aged 17 and 
lower relative to  those older than 17 (the boundary for the post-reform dropout age). 
Interestingly, the school reform effects in the crime reduced form for those age 17 and lower 
are a lot bigger for property crime, and not so different for violent and drug crime. So the in 
school incapacitation effect plays a pivotal role in deterring property crime.   
We also find a crime reducing deterrence effect of more schooling for all criminal 
activity post age 17, so there is evidence of a longer run crime reduction induced by the 
reform. These patterns of incapacitation and later deterrence shift the crime age profile, so 
the peak occurs at a later age following the reform. Our longitudinal data which follows 
individuals aged 15 to 21 (both in and out of school) lets us examine the dynamics of the 
relationship in more detail.  Analysing the observed crime age profile pre and post school 
reform reveals it is deterrence rather than age of onset due to incapacitation that alters the 
shape of the profile. Finally, we see that the crime reducing effects are concentrated in 
property crime and single crime incidence, rather than altering the behaviour of persistent 
offenders. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we outline the 
empirical tests of the causal impact of schooling on crime, and extension of the framework 
to look at incapacitation and shifts in crime-age profiles. Section 3 describes the data and 
the process of matching administrative data on crime and education for the population of 
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young people in Queensland. Section 4 reports the estimates of the causal impact of 
schooling on crime. Section 5 reports the results from studying incapacitation effects, shifts 
in the crime age profile and changing patterns of offender behaviour. Section 6 offers some 
concluding remarks. 
2. Empirical Models of Crime and Schooling
Crime and Schooling 
Consider a basic relationship between crime (C) and schooling (S) for individual i at time 
period t: 
Cit = βSit + γXit ൅	fሺa,	c,	tሻ	+ εit                                       (1) 
In (1), X is a set of control variables, f(a, c, t) is a function (to be discussed below) of the 
individual’s age (a), birth cohort (c) and time and εit an error term. The first empirical 
challenge, as well documented in prior work, is to obtain an unbiased estimate of β, the 
empirical association between crime and schooling.  The main econometric issue is that 
schooling is unlikely to be exogenous in (1), as a likely correlation with the error term 
renders ordinary least squares biased. To circumvent this issue, we implement Instrumental 
Variable (IV) estimation of (1) where we use the Earning and Learning school leaving age 
reform (SL) as an instrumental variable.  
In this set up, the two reduced form equations for crime and schooling (the first 
stage) are given respectively as: 
Cit = θ1SLit + π1Xit + fሺa,	c,	tሻ	൅ ε1it (2)
Sit = θ2SLit + π2Xit + fሺa,	c,	tሻ	൅	ε2it (3)
An IV estimate of the impact of schooling on crime is given by the ratio of the reduced form 
coefficients in (2) and (3),  θ1/θ2. In general, if this IV estimate is negative then crime 
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reduction from schooling works through the combination of the two reduced form 
relationships with: θ2 being positive if schooling laws increase education and θ1 < 0 if the 
schooling laws lower crime.  
Lochner and Moretti (2004), together with subsequent authors in the field, note that 
θ1 in the crime reduced form is likely to be negative for at least two distinct reasons: 
i) In the presence of a causal link between education and crime and if the raising of the
school dropout age raises education levels, then the coefficient on SL in the reduced form 
for crime will pick up this effect.  
ii) The reform itself may directly reduce crime, over and above any effect on schooling.
Whilst we are interested in the causal impact of education on crime, and begin by 
presenting estimates of this, we also frame some of our empirical work around the crime 
reduced form in (2). In fact, as we next discuss, we examine incapacitation effects and 
shifting crime-age profiles utilising this reduced form relationship. 
Incapacitation and Deterrence Effects 
If there is a direct impact of school leaving laws on crime, how might it operate? 
One clear way is if the law change forces youth to be in a supervised environment rather 
than roaming the streets, so there is an incapacitation effect that reduces crime. There is a 
body of evidence to support this which uses plausibly exogenous changes in the length of 
the school day or exploits random days in which schools do not open to identify 
incapacitation effects (Jacob and Lefgren, 2003, and Luallen, 2006).3 Also, Anderson 
3 Prior to this research that placed the question of establishing causality its forefront, there were earlier (non-
causal) estimates of the impact of time spent in school on crime (see, for example, Gottfredson, 1985, 
Farrington et al., 1986 or Witte and Tauchen, 1994). Hjalmarsson (2008) studied the impact of being arrested 
and incarcerated before finishing school on the probability of graduating high school, reporting there to be a 
strong negative association.  
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(2014) examines whether students affected by a dropout reform show different responses 
by age. 
In a similar vein to Anderson (2014), we examine whether the treatment effect from 
school reform varies by age. More specifically, we estimate separate specifications of the 
crime reduced form for individuals younger and older than the post-reform dropout age of 
17. This corresponds to estimating the following crime reduced forms:
Cit	ൌ	θ1a൑17SLit	൅	π1a൑17Xit	൅ f a൑17ሺa,	c,	tሻ	൅ ε1ita൑17 (4a) 
Cit	ൌ	θ1a൐17SLit	൅	π1a൐17Xit	൅ f a൐17ሺa,	c,	tሻ	൅ ε1ita൐17 (4b)
Estimating separate treatment effects (the θ1's) therefore enables us to explore whether 
incapacitation effects are operating in the a≤17 sub-sample. 
The second way in which we study incapacitation versus deterrence builds upon the 
insight that crime onset often begins in the teenage years and that criminal behaviour peaks 
in the late teenage years (as in the life course approaches to crime of Sampson, and Laub, 
1993, 1995). Thus one sees an inverse U-shape in the crime-age profile, which has often 
been modelled by imposing a quadratic functional form.4 If the incapacitation effect reduces 
criminal activity at these crucial ages, it may in addition generate a persistently lower crime 
rate as the cohort ages, since some of the cohort members will have avoided going down 
the wrong path at a crucial age.  
4 Almost two hundred years ago, Quetelet (1831) showed a peak in the late teens for crime in early nineteenth-
century France. A mass of subsequent research has confirmed the strong age-crime pattern, with crime peaking 
in the late teens and declining with age quite rapidly. Hirschi and Gottfredson (1983) proposed that crime-age 
profiles are broadly invariant over time and across demographic groups. Such a view has been challenged 
empirically by a number of authors. Examples are Greenberg (1985) who presents evidence that both the peak 
crime age and the rate of subsequent decline differs across crime types, localities, race and gender and Hansen 
(2003) who shows that the age-crime profile differs for those who leave school at the compulsory school 
leaving age and those who remain in education.. 
8 
We thus study whether, and if so how, the crime-age profile changes before and after 
the school reform (see Bell, Costa and Machin, 2016b, for a framework that links changing 
crime age profiles to changes in dropout age). To explain how we do this we need to place 
some structure upon the age-cohort-year f(a, c, t) function. As is well known, separating 
age, cohort and time effects offers an empirical challenge because of the identity t ≡ c + a. 
A fully saturated specification would include a full set of additive age, cohort and time 
effects (respectively denoted by αa, αc and αt) such that f(a, c, t) = αa + αc + αt. This fully 
saturated model is not identified as at least one age, cohort or year dummy needs to be 
excluded as the reference group. Deaton (1997) carefully discusses this, and also states that 
an alternative is to require the cohort effects to sum to zero. 
The school reform SL is a cohort level policy reform, with the first enrolment cohort 
affected being the 1990/91 birth cohort who are 16 during the 2006 school year. Thus, we 
study this with a regression discontinuity research design that looks at what happens before 
and after the reform for school cohorts born near to the first treated 1990/91 cohort.5 We 
use birth cohort as a running variable in this design. We therefore can include a full set of 
age and year effects in our empirical specifications (see below).  
We also estimate a more restricted specification that imposes a quadratic structure 
on age to pick up the well-established pattern of crime-age profiles commonly found in 
existing research. We present estimates of possible changes in the crime-age profile before 
and after the school reform using both the unrestricted age dummies and the quadratic 
functional form. 
5 For discussion of the standard regression discontinuity (RD) framework, and associated applications, see 
Imbens and Lemieux (2008) or Lee and Lemieux (2010) 
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The final set of issues we study are enabled by the nature of our rich longitudinal 
data following the same individuals from different birth cohorts over time. Specifically we 
examine whether there are pre and post reform changes in the offending behaviour of 
individuals aged between 15 and 21. We consider two specific dimensions. First, we study 
whether the reform has an effect on engaging in any form of offending, or whether it affects 
multiple offending. This lets us consider whether crime reductions are likely to generate 
desistence from those on the margins of crime participation in their teenage years, or 
whether it can act to reduce criminality amongst more persistent offenders. Second, and 
closely related to our study of possible shifts in crime age profiles, we consider whether age 
of onset – that is, the first time an individual commits a crime – differs before and after 
reform.  
3. Data and Descriptive Statistics
Data 
Much of the empirical literature examining the relationship between education and crime is 
forced to match across criminal offences data and individual level data that records 
education.  The reason is that most data sets recording criminal offences at the individual 
level do not contain information on education levels. In general the demographic data 
recorded along with criminal offences is limited to age and gender (and sometimes race). 
The existing literature then utilises these characteristics to derive average education level 
by birth cohort (age) and gender from the alternative data source. This matching then 
requires aggregation of individual level data into birth cohorts by gender to match the 
information on education and thus the entire focus is on the relationship between education 
and crime at the cohort level.  
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We are in the fortunate position of obtaining Queensland administrative data 
matched at the individual level across State agencies, Department of Education and Training 
(DET) and the Queensland Police Service (QPS). Thus, we have individual record data for 
the entire population of attendees at all Queensland Government funded schools, together 
with matched individual criminal offence data for the period 2002 to 2013. Our focus in this 
paper is on males aged 15-21. For most of the analysis, we work with a balanced panel that 
covers approximately 138,000 15-21 year old males, each of whom is observed for seven 
years. The precise sample structure is shown in Table 1, where the treatment group cells 
(those affected by the school reform, discussed in more detail below) are in bold. 
The crime data refers to alleged criminal offences in a given year, and so our focus 
is on whether an individual in a given year is an alleged offender. An alleged offender is a 
person who has allegedly committed a crime and has been processed for that offence by 
arrest, caution or warrant of apprehension. We have matched these data at individual level 
to the Queensland schooling data. In the latter we observe individuals until they complete 
their compulsory education.  
We consider two measures of schooling. The first is the number of years of 
compulsory education, which can reach a maximum of 12 years. Prior to the education 
reform we assume that the final observed year of grade school completed the individual’s 
education. For years post completion we assume schooling is fixed. Before the school 
reform students could leave school at age 15 with 10 years of completed schooling. After 
the reform, students had to stay on until they turn 17 years of age, which translates to 
completing 12 years of grade/high school education. A second measure, which is useful to 
show the nature of the school reform is whether or not the individual completed the 
equivalent of 11 years of schooling (broadly defined) or not. 
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Thus a major advantage of our data relative to that employed by previous literature 
is that we can match education and criminal offence data at the individual level. We follow 
the same individual through the education system and beyond, simultaneously tracking 
criminal offences. As Table 1 shows, we are able to follow individuals who are not affected 
by the school reform and complete their compulsory schooling under the old regime (e.g. 
the 1987/88 enrolment cohort); those who are directly affected (the first cohort being the 
1990/91 enrolment cohort who were turning age 16 in the first year of enactment of the 
reform); and those who are always in the new regime (e.g. the 1992/93 cohort). We thus 
study six birth cohorts tightly banded around the Earning and Learning reform, enabling a 
difference in difference approach within a regression discontinuity setting. This allows us 
to identify both the causal effect of education on crime, and to study the changing nature of 
the crime reduced form in detail. 
Descriptive Analysis 
Figure 1 shows what happens to the two schooling measures for the six cohorts in 
the window around the school reform (denoted by the vertical line between the 1989/90 and 
1990/91 cohorts). There is a very clear – and statistically significant – jump after the reform. 
The proportion of 17 year olds with at least 11 years of schooling jumps from around 75 to 
over 90 percent for the first post-reform cohort (as the discontinuity estimate, expressed in 
proportions as 0.156, shown in the subtitle of the left hand Figure demonstrates). Two years 
post-reform the proportion almost reaches the ceiling at 98 percent, as one would expect if 
the policy is binding.6 The right hand chart of Figure 1 shows the same cohort pattern for 
6 For example, of the 43,475 16 years olds enrolled in grade 11 in 2007, 43,172 (i.e. 99 percent) continued on 
to grade 12 in 2008. 
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the average years of schooling, with a significant jump up by 0.33 of a year, which again 
rises a little further two years post reform. 
Figure 2 shows the pattern for youth crime. There is a clear drop in the offending 
measure to the right of the discontinuity. The proportion drops from just under 0.08 to just 
under 0.07, or just under a one percentage point change (the strongly significant 
discontinuity estimate is -0.009, as shown in the Figure). Thus as more schooling was 
induced by the reform, male youth crime fell.  
Table 2 shows cohort by cohort means of the schooling and crime measures for both 
the pooled sample of 15-21 year olds (thus mixing up young men in and of school) as well 
as the sample restricted to 17 year olds only. It is very clear that the schooling measures rise 
significantly after the enactment of the Earning and Learning reform, and also that the 
proportion offending falls. These are the basic facts that underpin the empirical investigation 
of crime and schooling, which we turn to in the next two sections of the paper. 
4. The Causal Impact of Schooling on Youth Crime
Baseline Estimates 
The first main set of statistical results are presented in Table 3. The Table shows four sets 
of estimates of various crime and education specifications for two samples of male youth in 
Queensland.  The upper panel A shows estimates for the discontinuity sample of six cohorts, 
three before and three after the Earning and Learning reform. The lower panel B shows an 
even tighter window around the discontinuity for the 1989/90 through 1991/92 cohorts. 
In each panel, four specifications are shown. Specification (1) is the OLS estimate 
of a regression of crime on years of schooling, with a full set of age and year dummies, plus 
a linear cohort variable. These same controls are included in the other specifications, namely 
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the two reduced forms, for years of schooling in specification (2) and for crime in 
specification (3).  The final column (4) shows the causal estimates of education on crime, 
where the estimates are the ratio of those in (3) to (2).7 
The first thing to note is that results from the +/- 3 cohort window in panel A are 
very similar to the narrower +/- 2 window in panel B and so we can discuss results in 
general. The OLS specification shows that crime and education (column (1)) are negatively 
related to one another, with a statistically significant coefficient of -0.018 in both panels. 
Thus, as in prior work in the area, male crime and education are negatively correlated. 
Turning to the years of schooling first stage, and perhaps not at all surprisingly given 
the patterns shown in Figure 1, specification (2) uncovers a strong and binding impact of 
the Earning and Learning reform on years of schooling. In the upper panel 0.26 more years 
of schooling accrue on average to the male youth affected by the reform.  This is slightly 
lower at 0.17 in the lower panel due to dropping of the 1992/93 cohort. Thus the age 16 
youths in 1990/91 (the first cohort affected by the reform) who could only gain 1 rather than 
2 extra years receive a bigger weight than in panel A. 
The crime reduced form in specification (3) confirms the earlier graphical 
representation of the data, as crime amongst male youth is seen to be significantly lower in 
the post-reform treated cohorts.8 Finally, specification (4) shows a strong and significant 
causal crime reducing effect of education. The instrumental variable estimate in panel A is 
-0.030 and strongly significant. This amounts to a substantive reduction in crime induced 
7 Table 3 shows results for the completed years of schooling measure.  Qualitatively very similar results 
emerged if we modelled education as a dummy variable for ≥ 11 years or for ≥ 12 years, the results of which 
are available on request. 
8 Marginal effects from probit models of crime incidence revealed almost identical estimates (that only differ 
after the third decimal place) for the crime reduced form: for the specification (3) in panels A and B, the probit 
marginal effects (and associated standard errors) were the same as Table 3, respectively being -0.008 (0.002) 
and -0.006 (0.002). 
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by increased schooling. To place the result in context the pre-reform mean offending rate 
was around 0.080. 
Estimates By Crime Type 
 In Table 4 we show estimates for violent crime, property crime and drug crime as 
separate components of all crime. Schooling is seen to exert a significant causal impact on 
crime for all three types. Thus the causal effects are not manifesting themselves 
differentially, by moderating only some kinds of broad crime categories. In terms of the 
education reducing impact of crime on average, this applies to violent, property and drug 
offences. 
Robustness 
We probe these causal estimates in a number of directions that the data permit. In 
particular, we consider a number of issues of robustness with our causal results, as follows: 
1). To date our analysis has focussed on a balanced panel (7 waves per individual) of 15 to 
21 year olds in birth cohorts three years before and after the Earning and Learning reform. 
We do have data for a larger unbalanced panel, covering all young people in school for at 
least one year between 2002 and 2013. Appendix Table A1 shows results for this unbalanced 
panel for male youth crime participation, in a comparable way to the main all crime results 
reported in Table 3. The results show a reassuring pattern, with identification of a strong 
causal impact of schooling on crime. The only differences that occurs reflects the nature of 
the sample, which is now unbalanced around the schooling reform, and hence the first stage 
education impact is a little higher than in Table 3 at 0.358 additional years of schooling. The 
crime reduced form is also more negative, at -0.009. The structural form results show a 
strongly significant crime reducing causal effect of schooling of -0.028 (which is very 
similar to the -0.030 estimate from the balanced panel reported in panel A of Table 3). 
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2). Appendix Tables A2 and A3 show results comparable to Tables 3 and 4, but now using 
the number of offences per year rather than the yearly incidence measure we considered to 
date. In terms of interpretation and qualitative results the overall story remains the same. . 
The only slight difference is that effects seem a bit more pronounced for property crimes, 
which is not surprising as, in terms of numbers of offences, they are the major offence 
category amongst young people. 
3). If an older age cut-off is utilised to define the study sample, extending from ages 15 to 
25 inclusive, the same overall pattern of results persists. For this wider sample, the estimate 
(standard error) of a causal impact of schooling on crime comparable to specification (4) in 
panel A of Table 3 is -0.028 (0.005). However, adding in older age observations makes the 
sample unbalanced and skewed to the post-reform period. This is not so useful for the 
empirical analysis on incapacitation effects, crime-age profiles and individual offending 
patterns that we move to in the next section of the paper. So, for that, we stick with the 
balanced panel structure we have used for our main causal results. 
5. Incapacitation and Crime-Age Profiles
Incapacitation Effects 
To consider possible incapacitation effects due to students mandatorily staying in school to 
a later age, Table 5 shows separate estimates of the crime reduced form for young men aged 
17 and below and above 17 . Estimates are shown for all crime (in specification (1)) and 
separately for violent, property and drug offences (in specifications (2) through (4)).  
The all crime results from specification (1) show a significantly lower crime 
incidence for both age groups for those treated by the Earning and Learning reform. 
However, there is a suggestion of a more negative effect – at -0.9 of a percentage point 
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compared to -0.7 for the 17 and under age group.  This more negative estimate is in line 
with an incapacitation effect operating amongst those kept in the classroom up to a later 
age. 
Interestingly, when different crime types are considered (in (2) to (4)) this size of 
effect discrepancy seems to be much more pronounced for property crimes. Indeed, the 
violent crime effect is not as negative for the 17 and under age group and the drug crime 
effect is numerically the same. Thus incapacitation seems to reduce property crimes by 
more, a finding obtained in a different setting, but one that is qualitatively in line with the 
US studies of Jacob and Lefgren (2003) and Luallen (2006).9 
Shifts in Crime-Age Profiles 
The longitudinal dimension of our data allows us to follow young men over time 
and as they age between 15 and 21. This enables us to consider incapacitation effects from 
being kept in school and longer run crime deterrence effects that occur after leaving school 
by means of studying possible shifts in individual specific crime-age profiles. We examine 
crime-age profiles before and after the reform based on the crime reduced form 
specifications incorporating two different functional forms for age. In the upper panel A of 
Table 6, estimates are shown for age dummies (where the omitted reference group is age 
15), and in the lower panel B for a quadratic in age. 
As one would expect from the discussion of incapacitation effects for those above 
and below age 17, the estimated crime-age profiles in panel A show reduced crime incidence 
at lower ages and then less of a flattening at older ages. The same is true in panel B where 
9 To be more precise, this study and the two cited US studies report significant property crime reductions from 
incapacitation. The violent crime effect for the age 17 and under group in this study is still negative and 
statistically significant at the 5 percent level, whereas it is actually estimated to be positive in the two US 
studies. Thus the common feature is that property crime reductions form the most important dimension of 
crime reduction from incapacitation. This contrasts with Anderson (2014) for whom property and violent 
crimes (and for that matter drug crimes) seem to be significantly reduced by similar amounts. 
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the inverse U-shape flattens, and where solving the quadratic leads to the estimated peak 
age rising from 18.8 to 19.1 years pre versus post reform. Thus the maximum crime 
incidence is shifted upwards in terms of age, resulting from more crime reduction at younger 
ages.  
This changing nature of the crime-age profile is shown in Figure 3. The chart in the 
upper level quadrant is produced from the numbers in panel A of Table 6. It very clearly 
shows crime incidence falling, but by more at the younger ages. Thus incapacitation and 
deterrence are both important. The other three charts in Figure 3 show different patterns by 
type of crime.  It seems that the key dimension of crime reduction for younger individuals 
arises from lower property crime. The crime falls are much more neutral by age for violent 
and drug offences. 
Changes in Offending Behaviour 
We next use the longitudinal dimension of the data to explore whether there are 
changes in offending behaviour pre and post the Earning and Learning reform. We study 
two dimensions of changing criminal behaviour, repeat offending and age of onset.  Table 
7 summarises various estimates of the crime reduced form. 
Columns (1) to (4) of the Table shows estimates which enable us to consider whether 
the crime reductions due to the Earning and Learning reform reflect desistance from 
criminal behaviour from individuals who before the reform would have offended but after 
the reform did not, or whether it altered multiple offending. Column (1) shows that the 
likelihood of ever offending between ages 15 and 21, for our sample of 137814 young men, 
was significantly reduced post-reform. The mean of ever offending for the group of young 
men not affected by the reform was 0.276, and this falls by 0.049 (or an 18 percent 
reduction) for those affected. On the other hand when one considers changes amongst 
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offenders, there is no evidence of altered behaviour before and after the reform. 
Specifications (2) to (4) consider the likelihood of engaging in offending behaviour in 
multiple years.  The results suggest there is no evidence of a shift in the probability of 
committing offences in two or more years, three or more years nor in all seven years. 
Finally, in the last column (5) of the Table we consider whether age of offending 
onset is affected by the reform.  The mean age of onset for those not affected by the reform 
was 17.56, and the estimates show that this rose by a fairly modest 0.07 for those affected. 
This is statistically significant at the 10 percent level and is supportive of the earlier evidence 
that crime age profiles are altered by the reform, owing to slightly bigger crime reduction 
effects operating via incapacitation for those that remaining in school longer post-reform. 
6. Conclusions
In this paper, we use rich administrative data on education and crime covering several 
cohorts of all individuals attending state school in Queensland, Australia between the 
2002/03 and 2013/14 school years.  We study the causal links between male youth crime 
and education, using a school reform introduced in the 2006/07 school year that extended 
the school dropout age by two more years. 
The first key finding of the paper is the uncovering of a strong causal crime reducing 
effect of education for young men. This confirms evidence from elsewhere in the world in 
which education policy reforms increasing minimum school leaving age have had the dual 
effect of significantly raising education participation and deterring criminal activity. The 
effects are sizeable, and emerge for participation in all offending behaviour, and also within 
the distinct domains of violent, property and drug crime. 
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The rich longitudinal information we have, which follows around 140,000 young 
men through compulsory schooling and beyond, means we can probe further to understand 
what underlies this causal impact. We report evidence of crime reduction being due to both 
incapacitation whereby young men are compelled to remain in school longer, but also of 
deterrence effects that go beyond the schooling years. Digging deeper reveals that this 
balance of larger crime reductions for those who are kept in school operates mostly through 
a reduction in property crime, rather than violent or drug related offences. The presence of 
incapacitation effects also shifts the crime age profiles such that they peak at a later age 
post-reform, and modestly raise the age of onset of crime. Finally, the crime reductions 
seem to operate through permanent deterrence for those affected by the reform as there is a 
large drop in the proportion of young men who ever offend between ages 15 and 21, but no 
change in multiple offending that occurs pre and post the reform. Overall, it seems that, as 
one might intuitively expect, the education reform brought about desistence in crime from 
male youth on the margins of offending in their teenage years rather than reductions in 
criminality among persistent offenders. 
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Figure 1: Education Before and After the Earning and Learning Education Reform 
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Figure 2: Youth Crime Incidence Before and After the Earning and Learning Education Reform 
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Figure 3: Youth Crime Age Profiles Before and After the Earning and Learning Education Reform 
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Table 1: Sample Structure of Age Group By Year and Birth Cohort 
School Year 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
1987/88 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 
1988/89 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 
Birth 1989/90 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 
Cohort 1990/91 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 
 1991/92 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 
 1992/93 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 
Notes: Birth cohorts correspond to school enrolment year, which runs from July 1 to June 30. Age is the year that an individual from a given birth cohort will turn 
in the school year. So, for example, an individual in birth cohort 1990/91 will turn 16 in school year 2006. The Earning and Learning reforms came into place on 
1 January 2006, so for Queensland youth aged 15 or more the first affected cohort that had to stay on beyond age 15 was the 1990/91 birth cohort. 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
Birth Cohort Ages 15-21 Age 17 
Proportion With 11 
or More Years of 
Schooling 
Average Years of 
Schooling 
Proportion 
Offending 
Proportion With 11 
or More Years of 
Schooling 
Average Years of 
Schooling 
Proportion 
Offending 
1987/88 0.678 11.065 0.076 0.802 11.339 0.078
1988/89 0.630 10.943 0.079 0.759 11.183 0.076
1989/90 0.620 10.961 0.077 0.747 11.215 0.076
1990/91 0.748 11.207 0.068 0.903 11.542 0.067
1991/92 0.815 11.352 0.064 0.985 11.722 0.066
1992/93 0.815 11.356 0.062 0.984 11.726 0.065
Change  
(1990/91 to 1992/93) – 
(1987/88 to 1989/90) 
0.158 
(0.002) 
0.332 
(0.004) 
-0.013 
(0.001) 
0.196 
(0.002) 
0.438 
(0.004) 
-0.011 
(0.001) 
Number of individuals 137814 137814 137814 137814 137814 137814
Sample size 964698 964698 964698 137814 137814 137814
Notes: Standard errors, clustered at person level, in parentheses. 
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Table 3: The Causal Effect of Education on Male Youth Crime, Any Offence 
Probability of Committing An Offence, Male Youth Aged 15-21, 2002 to 2013 
Crime  Years of Schooling Crime  Crime 
OLS OLS First Stage OLS Reduced Form IV Structural Form 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. 1987/88 to 1992/93 Birth Cohorts 
Years of Compulsory Schooling -0.018 (0.001) -0.030 (0.007) 
Earning or Learning Reform Dropout Age Increase 0.264 (0.008) -0.008 (0.002) 
First Stage F-test 1080 
Age Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Individuals 137814 137814 137814 137814 
Sample Size 964698 964698 964698 964698 
B. 1988/89 to 1991/92 Birth Cohorts 
Years of Compulsory Schooling -0.018 (0.001) -0.038 (0.014) 
Earning or Learning Reform Dropout Age Increase 0.165 (0.011) -0.006 (0.002) 
First Stage F-test 246 
Age Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Individuals 96817 96817 96817 96817 
Sample Size 677719 677719 677719 677719 
Notes: Standard errors clustered by individual in parentheses. All specifications include a linear birth cohort variable. 
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Table 4: Male Youth Crime and Education, By Crime Type 
Probability of Committing An Offence, Male Youth Aged 15-21, 2002 to 2013 
Violent Crime  Property Crime Drug Crime 
OLS Reduced Form IV Structural Form OLS Reduced Form IV Structural Form OLS Reduced Form IV Structural Form 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. 1987/88 to 1992/93 Birth Cohorts 
Years of Compulsory Schooling -0.010 (0.004) -0.015 (0.004) -0.013 (0.003) 
Earning or Learning Reform Dropout Age Increase -0.003 (0.001) -0.004 (0.001) -0.003 (0.001) 
Age Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Individuals 137814 137814 137814 137814 137814 137814
Sample Size 964698 964698 964698 964698 964698 964698
B. 1988/89 to 1991/92 Birth Cohorts 
Years of Compulsory Schooling -0.015 (0.008) -0.014 (0.009) -0.013 (0.006) 
Earning or Learning Reform Dropout Age Increase -0.003 (0.001) -0.002 (0.001) -0.002 (0.001)
Age Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Individuals 96817 96817 96817 96817 96817 96817
Sample Size 677719 677719 677719 677719 677719 677719
Notes: As for Table 3. 
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Table 5: Youth Crime Reduced Forms and Incapacitation Effects 
Probability of Committing An Offence, Male Youth Aged 15-21, 2002 to 2013 
Any Crime Violent Crime Property Crime Drug Crime 
OLS Reduced Form OLS Reduced Form OLS Reduced Form OLS Reduced Form 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. Age≤17 
Earning or Learning Reform Dropout Age Increase -0.009 (0.002) -0.002 (0.001) -0.006 (0.002) -0.003 (0.001) 
Age Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Individuals 137814 137814 137814 137814
Sample Size 413442 413442 413442 413442
B. Age>17 
Earning or Learning Reform Dropout Age Increase -0.007 (0.002) -0.004 (0.002) -0.002 (0.001) -0.003 (0.001) 
Age Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Individuals 137814 137814 137814 137814
Sample Size 551256 551256 551256 551256
Notes: As for Table 3, Panel A specifications (1), (3) and (5). 
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Table 6: Crime Age Profiles and Dropout Age 
Probability of Committing An Offence,  
Male Youth Aged 15-21, 2002 to 2013 
Any Crime 
OLS Reduced Form OLS Reduced Form 
Before Dropout Age Increase After Dropout Age Increase 
(1) (2)
A. Age Dummies 
Age = 16 0.010 (0.001) 0.009 (0.001) 
Age = 17 0.027 (0.002) 0.023 (0.001) 
Age = 18 0.041 (0.002) 0.037 (0.002) 
Age = 19 0.041 (0.002) 0.040 (0.002) 
Age = 20 0.032 (0.002) 0.035 (0.002) 
Age = 21 0.026 (0.002) 0.029 (0.001) 
Number of Individuals 54272 83542 
Sample Size 379904 584794 
Age 15 Proportion Committing An Offence 0.053 0.039 
B. Age Quadratic 
Age 0.107 (0.007) 0.088 (0.005) 
Age2 / 100 -0.283 (0.018) -0.223 (0.013) 
Number of Individuals 54272 83542 
Sample Size 379904 584794 
 Notes: Standard errors clustered by individual in parentheses. All specifications include a linear birth cohort variable. 
31 
Table 7: Change in Offender Behaviour Before and After Reform 
Ever Offends Offends in More 
Than One Year 
Offends in More 
Than Two Years 
Offends in All 
Seven Years 
Onset Age 
OLS Reduced Form OLS Reduced Form OLS Reduced Form OLS Reduced Form OLS Reduced Form 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Earning or Learning Reform Dropout Age Increase -0.049 (0.005) -0.009 (0.011) -0.007 (0.009) 0.001 (0.002) 0.072 (0.040) 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Individuals 137814 34421 34421 34421 34421
Pre-Reform Mean of Dependent Variable 0.276 0.481 0.248 0.009 17.559 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.  
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Appendix – Additional Results 
Table A1: The Causal Effect of Education on Male Youth Crime, Any Offence, Unbalanced Sample 
Probability of Committing An Offence, Male Youth Aged 15-21, 2002 to 2013 
Crime  Years of Schooling Crime  Crime 
OLS OLS First Stage OLS Reduced Form IV Structural Form 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unbalanced Panel 
Years of Compulsory Schooling -0.017 (0.001) -0.028 (0.003) 
Earning or Learning Reform Dropout Age Increase 0.387 (0.005) -0.011 (0.001) 
First Stage F-test 6499 
Age Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Individuals 395057 395057 395057 395057 
Sample Size 2096123 2096123 2096123 2096123 
Notes: Standard errors clustered by individual in parentheses. All specifications include a linear birth cohort variable. For different orders of cohort polynomials entered, 
the specification (4) IV estimates (standard errors) were as follows:  quadratic, -0.034 (0.003); cubic, -0.034 (0.003).
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Table A2: The Causal Effect of Education on Male Youth Crime, Number of Offences 
Number of Offences, Male Youth Aged 15-21, 2002 to 2013 
Crime  Years of Schooling Crime  Crime 
OLS OLS First Stage OLS Reduced Form IV Structural Form 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1987/88 to 1992/93 Birth Cohorts 
Years of Compulsory Schooling -0.093 (0.004) -0.131 (0.041) 
Earning or Learning Reform Dropout Age Increase 0.264 (0.008) -0.035 (0.011) 
First Stage F-test 1080 
Age Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Individuals 137814 137814 137814 137814 
Sample Size 964698 964698 964698 964698 
Notes: Standard errors clustered by individual in parentheses. All specifications include a linear birth cohort variable. 
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Table A3: Male Youth Crime and Education, Number of Offences, By Crime Type 
Number of Offences, Male Youth Aged 15-21, 2002 to 2013 
Violent Crime  Property Crime Drug Crime 
OLS Reduced Form IV Structural Form OLS Reduced Form IV Structural Form OLS Reduced Form IV Structural Form 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1987/88 to 1992/93 Birth Cohorts 
Years of Compulsory Schooling -0.023 (0.014) -0.072 (0.029) -0.024 (0.006) 
Earning or Learning Reform Dropout Age Increase -0.006 (0.003) -0.019 (0.007) -0.006 (0.002) 
Age Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Individuals 137814 137814 137814 137814 137814 137814
Sample Size 964698 964698 964698 964698 964698 964698
Notes: As for Table A2 
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